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VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
ABSTRACT 
Sub judice contempt restricts freedom of expression by limiting what can be 
published in relation to a matter before the courts in order to protect the right to a fair 
trial. This paper examines the law of sub judice contempt and the rights and interests 
that are involved in media coverage of criminal trials. It argues that sub judice 
contempt is necessary to protect the right to a fair trial as publicity surrounding a trial 
may prejudice jurors, and there are no satisfactory measures which would counteract 
this prejudice. It further argues that when balancing the competing interests involved 
in sub judice contempt New Zealand courts should give maximum protection to the 
right to a fair trial. This would involve temporarily limiting freedom of expression 
whenever there is a reasonable risk to a fair trial unless this would endanger public 
safety. This approach goes further than the current approach of the courts but aligns 
with New Zealand's international obligations. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 15,264 words. 
Contempt-Freedom of expression-Fair trial 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial are both fundamental human 
rights protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. High profile criminal 
trials - such as those faced by David Bain and Scott Watson - illustrate that these 
rights may conflict. For this reason sub judice contempt is used to restrict some 
aspects of media coverage of criminal trials. This paper examines sub judice 
contempt and the impact that it has on the rights and interests which are involved. Is 
assesses whether restriction of media coverage of criminal trials is necessary and 
identifies the appropriate balance to strike between the competing interests. 
This paper begins by giving an overview of the law of sub judice contempt. 
First the rationale behind the contempt jurisdiction and some practical matters are 
briefly covered. The legal rules for what can be published about a criminal trial and 
when it can be published are then set out. 
Part III then identifies the different interests affected by sub judice contempt-
freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and the public interest. The 
significance of each interest and the reasons for protection of each interest are 
considered in turn. 
Part IV seeks to answer the question of whether sub judice contempt is 
necessary. This is done by reference to two questions - whether media coverage of 
criminal trials endangers the right to fair trial, and whether there exist any feasible 
alternatives to restricting freedom of expression. This part argues that there is 
sufficient evidence that publicity surrounding a trial may cause juror prejudice to 
justify the retention of sub judice contempt. It further argues that there are no 
acceptable alternatives to restricting publication. It concludes that sub judice 
contempt is necessary for the protection of the right to a fair trial. 
Finally, part V assesses what the appropriate balance is between the rights and 
interests involved in sub judice contempt. The approaches taken in several 
jurisdictions are examined before concluding that in the context of sub judice 
5 
contempt in New Zealand it is appropriate to restrict freedom of expression wheneve
r 
there is a real risk to the right to a fair trial, unless there is a danger to public safety. 
The conclusions made by this paper may have significant impacts for the 
current level of media coverage of criminal trials in New Zealand - a case in poin
t 
being the extraordinary level of publicity surrounding David Bain in recent months. 
II SUB JUDICE CONTEMPT-AN OVERVIEW 
A What is Sub Judice Contempt? 
Sub judice contempt is a class of contempt which relates to publishing 
information about matters that are due to be or are currently being tried in court
. 
Contempt of court is concerned with protecting the administration of justice. 
1 
Protecting the administration of justice covers both actualities ( ensuring that fair trial
s 
are actually received) and perceptions ( ensuring that public perception is that a fai
r 
trial has been received). 
2 In the context of sub judice contempt this means that the 
sub judice rule exists to prevent the risk of prejudice to a fair trial posed by the
 
potential of publicity to influence potential jurors, but also to maintain public
 
confidence that the accused has received a fair and unbiased trial. This is achieved by
 
restricting publication of material which poses a risk to a fair trial. 
The question of contempt can arise either after contemptuous material has 
been published or before publication if an injunction is sought by the Solicitor
-
General. 3 If material has been published which breaches the sub judice rule those 
involved in its publication may be punished by fine or imprisonment. If the materia
l 
has not yet been published the court may grant an injunction to prevent publication. 
4 
Contempt is a criminal charge and therefore the onus is on the plaintiff to prove
 
1 Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd [1978] 1 NZLR 225, 229 (CA) Richmond P for the
 Court. 
2 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (5 ed, Oxford University P
ress, 
Auckland, 2005) 388. 
3 Ibid, 391. 
4 Ibid, 381 . 
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beyond reasonable doubt that the publication in question tends to undermine the 
administration of justice. 5 
The courts have inherent jurisdiction to punish for contempt and although 
some areas of contempt are codified, the courts largely rely on the common law in 
exercising this jurisdiction. 6 Sub judice contempt has not been codified in New 
Zealand. 
Not all publications about criminal trials are prohibited by the sub judice rule. 
A publication must be published within the sub judice period and breach the test for 
contempt before publication will be punished. This section of the paper sets out the 
relevant law as to what can be published about a criminal trial and when it can be 
published. 
B The Sub Judice Period 
1 When does the period begin? 
There are two schools of thought on when the sub judice period begins - the 
first being that a matter is not sub judice until proceedings have begun (for instance 
when an arrest is made) and the second being that the sub judice period begins when 
criminal proceedings are likely. 
The first position is the approach taken in Australia. This was confirmed by 
the High Court of Australia in James v Robinson where the majority of the Court held 
that those associated with the publication of prejudicial eyewitness accounts of a 
crime could not be held liable for contempt because the publication in question 
occurred before court proceedings had commenced. This was the case even though at 
the time of publication a manhunt was being conducted, and complaints were laid 
against the accused only two days after publication. The Court held that contempt is 
to be judged at the time of publication so, as the accused was not a party to criminal 
s Solicitor-General v Radio Avon Ltd, above n 1, 234 Richmond P for the Court; Gisborne Herald Co 
Ltd v Solicitor-Genera/ [1995) 3 NZLR 563 , 567 (CA) Richardson J for the Court. 6 Taylor v Attorney-Genera/ [1975) 2 NZLR 675, 678 (CA) Wild CJ. 
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proceedings at the time of publication, no contempt 
could be found. 
7 A similar 
approach is also taken in the United Kingdom Contem
pt of Court Act 1981 which 
defines when criminal proceedings become active by re
ference to identifiable actions 
- arrest without warrant, the issue of a warrant of arre
st or summons to appear, the 
service of an indictment or an oral charge. 
8 Contempt can only be found if it relates 
to an active proceeding. 
The New Zealand approach to when the sub judice per
iod begins is found in 
the Court of Appeal's decision in Television New Zeala
nd Ltd v Solicitor-Genera/. 
This case was an appeal by Television New Zealand 
against an interim injunction 
which had been granted by the High Court. The injunct
ion prevented the broadcast of 
a story about a murder of a 17 year old boy which na
med the prime suspect in the 
case, showed a photo of the suspect and stated that he w
as on the run and that he was 
believed to be armed with a shotgun. Television Ne
w Zealand relied on James v 
Robinson as authority that the Court has no jurisdiction t
o protect a fair trial where 
proceedings are "merely potential". The Court of Appe
al rejected this argument and 
held that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pro
tect a criminal trial against 
prejudice when "the commencement of criminal procee
dings is highly likely". 
9 This 
means that the sub judice period may begin even when 
charges have not been laid, as 
long as it is highly likely that this will happen. 
This is the approach favoured by the New Zealand L
aw Commission as it 
ensures greater protection for fair trial values by allowin
g protection of proceedings to 
commence earlier than the first approach. This dis
courages the publication of 
prejudicial information at any time prior to trial, regard
less of whether an arrest has 
been made or not. 
10 This approach does not have the advantage of identify
ing with 
certainty the precise moment when the sub judice period
 begins, which may make the 
position of the media more difficult, but the l
egal requirement that "the 
commencement of criminal proceedings is highly lik
ely" does give a significant 
amount of guidance on the matter. 
1 James v Robinson (1963) 109 CLR 593, 607 Kitto, Taylor
, Menzies and Owen JJ. 
8 Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), Schedule 1. 
9 Television New Zealand Ltd v Solicitor-Genera/ (1989] 1 N
ZLR 1, 3 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
10 New Zealand Law Commission Juries in Criminal Tria
ls Part Two: A Discussion Paper (NZLC 
PP37(1), Wellington, 1999) 75 . 
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2 When does the period end? 
The sub judice period does not end when the jury has delivered its verdict but 
rather continues until any appeals have been determined or until it is clear that there 
will be no appeal. 11 It will be clear that there will be no appeal when the appeal 
period has expired - generally 28 days after the date of conviction or, if sentencing 
occurs after conviction, 28 days after sentencing. 12 
C Legal Test 
The test for whether a publication breaches the sub judice rule is whether: 13 
[A]s a matter of practical reality the actions of the particular respondent caused a real 
risk, as distinct from a remote possibility, of interference with the administration of 
justice; here, specifically, interference with a fair trial. Risk is assessed not by the 
actual outcome but by the tendency of the publication, although subsequent events may 
form part of the evidence. While the meaning of publications is decided by the 
impression made on the hypothetical ordinary reasonable reader ( or, in the case of 
radio, listener) the tendency is assessed by the Court. 
The sub judice rule therefore prevents publishing information which has a real risk of 
prejudice to a fair trial and punishes those who breach this rule. This risk is assessed 
by reference not to the actual results of the publication but to its tendency. In 
assessing whether material tends to cause prejudice the Court will look to both the 
content and the circumstances of the publication. It is the overall effect of both of 
these factors which is important - neither factor is on its own determinative. 14 
1 Content 
There are several broad categories of information that have been identified by 
the courts as being potentially contemptuous. These categories include material 
11 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 394-395. 
12 Crimes Act 1961, s 388(1), but the appeal period may be extended by the Court of Appeal under s 
388(2). 
13 Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 45, 47 (HC, Full Court) Eichelbaum 
CJ. 
14 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 569 Richardson J for the Court. 
9 
which is inadmissible, or likely to be inadmissible, at trial; co
ntentious details of the 
case; matters which might affect witnesses; and impro
per reports of court 
proceedings. The content of the publication includes not just
 the information that it 
contains - the way in which the information is presented is also
 significant. There are 
therefore two further categories of publications that may be in
 contempt of court not 
because of what they say, but because of how they say it -
those which contain 
emotive reporting and those that prejudge the case. 
15 These categories are examined 
below. It should be noted that these categories are not exhau
stive and any content 
which tends to interfere with the administration of justice may
 be liable for contempt 
proceedings. These categories do however encompass the m
ost common situations 
where the issue of sub judice contempt arises. 
(a) Material which is inadmissible or likely to be inadmissib
le at trial 
Material which is inadmissible or likely not to be admitted at th
e trial is likely 
to be found to be contemptuous. The purpose of restricting 
the publication of this 
material is directly linked to ensuring that the accused recei
ves a fair trial by an 
unbiased jury. Restricting the publication of this material make
s sure that information 
which the rules of evidence may not allow to be put before a jur
y in court because it is 
more prejudicial than probative is not presented to the jurors thr
ough other means. 
16 
An example of evidence which is likely to be inadmissible
 at trial is the 
previous record or bad character of the accused. In Gisbo
rne Herald Co Ltd v 
Solicitor-General the publication that was found to be in con
tempt of court was an 
article which detailed the previous criminal record of a man a
ccused of assaulting a 
police officer, including another unrelated assault charge that h
e was due to face later 
that week. The Court of Appeal held: 
17 
To publish the criminal record of an accused or comment on 
the previous bad character 
of an accused before a trial is a prime example of in
terference with the due 
15 These categories are based largely on the categories formulat
ed in John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, 
above n 2, 396-412. An alternative formulation can be found 
in The Laws of New Zealand 
(LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2007) Contempt of Court 
paras 13-16 (last updated May 2007) 
www. lexisnexis. corn. 
16 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 396. 
17 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 568 Ric
hardson J for the Court. 
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administration of justice and, subject to considerations such as time and place, is 
almost invariably regarded as a serious contempt. 
In another case a television channel was found to be in contempt after a 
television broadcast of a programme detailing an escape from prison six years earlier 
by a man who was at the time facing trial on an unrelated matter. The programme 
gave details of the man's previous convictions, gang associations and familiarity with 
firearms, all of which were matters which the jury were not to be made aware of.18 
(b) Contentious details of the case 
Even if evidence is admissible it may be contempt to publish it before a trial. 
Generally only those "bare facts" which could be obtained by any eye-witness can be 
published before a trial, and not details that may be contested at trial. 19 This is 
because it is important that jurors do not come to the trial having already formed 
opinions about contentious issues that the case may turn on. The facts published must 
not connect a person with a crime, not be likely to be in dispute at trial and must be 
completely accurate. Information outside of these parameters could influence 
potential jurors before the case begins and prevent them hearing the case with open 
minds. 20 
An example of information which falls outside the parameters outlined above 
is when newspapers conduct their own investigation into a crime and publish the 
"evidence" that they find. This was illustrated in the English Case R v Evening 
Standard; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions. In this case a newspaper had 
sent a team of reporters to investigate a murder which was the subject of a large 
amount of public interest and had then published a series of articles relating to their 
findings. The Court held that it was contempt of court for a newspaper to undertake 
their own investigation into the facts of an alleged crime and to publish the results of 
the investigation.21 It noted that as it was not possible to anticipate what issues were 
18 Solicitor-General v TV3 Network Services Ltd (1998) 16 CRNZ 401 (HC, Full Court). 
19 Parker v Peacock (1912) CLR 577,588 Griffith CJ. 
20 John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 402. 
21 R v Evening Standard; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (1924) 40 TLR 833, 835-836 (KB) 
Hewart LCJ for the Court. 
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likely to be important at trial contentious details should not be published,
22 stating that 
"[a] man should be tried on evidence, not investigations".
23 
( c) Matters which might influence witnesses 
As well as potential jurors, it is important not to influence witnesses. For this
 
reason publications which may have an effect on witnesses are also prohibited
 by the 
sub judice rule. An example of information that may influence witne
sses is 
publication of photographs of the accused where identification will be an issue
 at trial. 
This issue arose in Attorney-General v Tonks. In this case a newspaper 
published a front-page article which included a photograph of a man who h
ad been 
arrested for a murder at a time when the police were conducting "identi
fication 
parades" to see if witnesses could identify the accused from a line-up of me
n. The 
Court found that the publication of a photograph of the accused may have c
aused a 
witness who was unable to form a clear mental picture of the man they had 
seen to 
derive the mental picture based on scrutiny of the photograph. 
24 The Court therefore 
found that it is contempt of court to publish the photograph of someone that h
as been 
accused of a crime "where it is reasonably clear that the question of identity
 of the 
accused person with the criminal has arisen or may arise". 
25 
( d) Improper reports of court proceedings 
The concept of open justice means that unless there is a suppression order, and
 
subject to a few statutory exceptions, the media are free to report proceedings 
held in 
a public court. This freedom does not however protect inaccurate or mis
leading 
reporting of trials. As this kind of reporting may influence jurors or witness
es this 
may also be liable for contempt.
26 
(e) Emotive reporting 
22 Ibid, 835 Lord Heward CJ for the Court. 
23 Ibid, 834 Roche J. 
24 Attorney-Genera/ v Tonks [1934] NZLR 141, 154 (SC, Full Court) Blair J. 
2s Ibid, 146 Myers CJ. 
26 See John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 407-408. 
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Material may influence potential jurors not just because of the information it 
contains but also because of the way in which it is portrayed. It may therefore be 
found to be contempt to report on a matter before the courts in a way that is likely to 
arouse strong sentiments in potential jurors. This is because it may prevent them from 
being impartial if selected to serve on the jury. The cases suggest however that there 
will be a very high threshold to be met before a court will find contempt in this kind 
of publication. 27 
(t) Prejudgement 
The final category of content that may give rise to contempt is prejudgement 
of a matter before the courts. It is contemptuous to publish anything which goes 
beyond "fair and temperate" criticism of a party to the proceedings and purports to 
express an opinion on the merits of a particular case. 28 This category is concerned not 
just with the potential for jurors or witnesses to be influenced but also with 
maintaining confidence in the judicial system. 29 
2 Circumstances 
Even if a publication falls very clearly into one of the categories identified 
above, it may not be contemptuous if the circumstances in which it was published 
make it unlikely that it will cause prejudice to criminal proceedings. There are 
several factors in the circumstances of the publication of information which can 
influence whether it is likely to prejudice a trial, the main ones being the length of 
time before the trial and where and how widely the information is published. 
(a) Length oftime before the trial 
The length of time between publication and the trial is significant as the lapse 
of time may mean that the initial impact of the publication on potential jurors has 
dissipated before the trial commences. In Gisborne Herald the Court of Appeal stated 
27 Ibid, 405-407. 
28 Attorney-General v Times Newspapers Ltd [1973] 3 All ER 54, 62 (HL) Lord Reid. 
29 Ibid, 60 (HL) Lord Reid; John F Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 409. 
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that it was unlikely that the effect of media coverage w
ould continue beyond six to 
eight months after publication. 
30 Potentially prejudicial information published a long 
time before a trial is scheduled to begin may therefore n
ot have enough of a tendency 
to endanger a fair trial to fall within the sub judice rule. 
(b) Where the information is published 
The audience that receives the information is also signif
icant. If the audience 
receiving the information are not potential jurors - for ins
tance if publication occurs in 
a different city than where the trial will be held - then i
t is unlikely that liability for 
contempt will be found. 
31 With the increased use of the internet as a source for new
s 
and the relatively small size of New Zealand it is unlik
ely that many situations will 
arise when a publication may be exempt from liability on
 this ground. 
D Summary 
Sub judice contempt is concerned with ensuring that fa
ir trials are received 
and that public confidence in the administration of jus
tice is maintained. The sub 
judice rule therefore prevents the publication of inform
ation about likely or actual 
criminal proceedings which cause a real risk of prejudice
 to a fair trial. Whether there 
is a risk to a trial is assessed by reference to the conte
nt and circumstances of the 
publication. 
The remainder of this paper examines what rights and int
erests are involved in 
the sub judice rule, the extent to which the rights con
flict and the balance which 
should be struck between them. 
III RIGHTS AND INTERESTS INVOLVED 
The sub judice rule has important implications to two rights conta
ined in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 - freedom of expr
ession and the right to a fair 
trial. Other interests may also be affected by the operat
ion of the sub judice rule, in 
30 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 5
70-571 Richardson J for the Court. 
31 Ibid, 568-569 Richardson J for the Court. 
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particular the maintenance of public confidence in the justice system and public 
safety. 
This section of the paper seeks to explore the various rights that the sub judice 
rule is said to restrict or protect. It first examines freedom of expression and looks at 
what freedom of expression means, the arguments which support freedom of 
expression and its relevance in the reporting of criminal trials. It then sets out what 
the right to a fair trial entails and who the right burdens and benefits. This section 
then briefly identifies several other interests which may be affected by the operation 
of the sub judice rule. 
The discussion contained in this section sets the scene for the later sections 
which will examine whether media coverage necessarily impinges on the right to a 
fair trial and will then look at the balance that should be struck between the competing 
rights in this context. 
A Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression is guaranteed by section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 which states "[ e ]veryone has the right to freedom of expression, 
including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any 
kind in any form" . 32 It has been described as "unquestionably one of the most 
important rights in the Bill of Rights". 33 Despite its importance there is not an 
absolute right to free speech, rather there is a right to be protected against unjustified 
restriction of expression. 34 
There are several arguments that explain why freedom of expression is so 
important. As can be seen in the legislative provision, freedom of expression is 
concerned both with the right to convey information and with the right to receive 
information. For this reason arguments in support of freedom of expression can focus 
32 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14. 
33 Paul Rishworth et al The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2003) 
308. 
34 This is the result of section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 but is also arguably the 
case even in the absence of a legislative provision justifying limitations on rights - see Eric Barendt 
Freedom of Speech (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 7. 
15 
either on the speaker or the audience. 
35 This distinction may be relevant to what 
restrictions are permitted on the form of expression being protected. Ian Cram argues 
that when an argument is focussed on the right of the speaker there will be a higher 
threshold for allowing interference with speech than when an argument is focussed on 
the right of the audience. In the former instance a restriction should only be justified 
in the case of a compelling community interest, while in the latter restriction will be 
justified if on balance other interests outweigh the value of expression.
36 
The main arguments for freedom of expression are the argument from truth, 
the argument from democracy and the argument from individual self-fulfilment. The 
first two arguments are audience focussed while the latter is speaker focussed. 
Assessing which argument most closely aligns with the argument for unrestricted 
reporting of criminal trials allows the freedom of expression implications of the sub 
judice rule to be examined. 
The argument from truth is the traditional argument for freedom of expression 
put forward by the likes of John Stuart Mill. It argues that in order for truth to be 
attained and established opinion tested individuals must have freedom to access the 
views of others and to communicate their own views. 
37 A development of this 
argument is seen in the marketplace of ideas theory which holds that the best test of 
the truth of an idea is whether the idea is accepted in the competition of the market. 
38 
There are two important problems with the application of this argument to media 
coverage of trials. The first is that the truth of the information the media would wish 
to convey is often not in dispute. An example of this type of information is the 
criminal record of the accused. The argument from truth cannot convincingly be used 
to justify the publication of material to which there is no debate over its truthfulness. 
39 
The second problem with applying this argument to coverage of trials is that it is not 
the role of society in this instance to determine what the truth is when facts are 
35 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 23. 
36 Ian Cram A Virtue Less Cloistered: Courts, Speech and Constitutions (Hart Publishing, Portland, 
2002) 2-3; 14. 
37 Ibid, 7. 
38 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 
2002) 8. 
39 Ian Cram, above n 36, 9. 
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disputed. This role is to be left to the jury, who will receive all of the information that 
the evidence rules allow over the course of the trial.40 
The argument from democracy provides a better fit. This argument states that 
public discussion of public issues is necessary in order for citizens to understand 
political issues and be able to participate effectively in the democratic process. 41 
Media coverage of trials clearly falls within this argument. Reporting of court 
proceedings plays a vital role in informing the public of "how justice is being 
administered in our courts"42 and for most people is the only available source of 
information about the courts. 43 This argument focuses on the right of the audience to 
receive information, in this case the right of the public to find out what is happening 
in court. As such, pursuant to Cram's analysis above, it may be acceptable to impose 
restrictions when other interests outweigh the interest of the public in receiving the 
information. Nevertheless, it is clear that the sub judice rule imposes a restriction on 
a form of expression which the argument from democracy would protect. 
The final main argument is the argument from individual self-fulfilment which 
focuses on the interest of the speaker and argues that restriction of expression inhibits 
the development of personality. 44 There are however other aspects of liberty which 
are necessary for individual self-fulfilment - for example personal freedom from 
detention, something which the accused may be deprived of if unrestrained coverage 
of trials were allowed. It is also questionable whether the media require the ability to 
report restricted details of trials in order to achieve self-fulfilment. This argument is 
therefore not particularly relevant in this context. 
The sub judice rule clearly restricts freedom of expression by preventing 
publication of some details about trials. As the way in which the sub judice rule will 
operate is not always easily discernible it may also have a "chilling effect" on 
expression and prevent more expression than that which comes within its reach. 45 An 
40 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 337. 
41 Wojciech Sadurski, above n 38, 20-21. 
4' R v Felixstowe Justices, ex parte Leigh [1987] 1 All ER 551, 558 (QB) Watkins LJ. 43 Ian Cram, above n 36, 13. 
44 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 13. 
45 M. David Lepofsky Open Justice: The Constitutional Right to Attend and Speak about Criminal 
Proceedings (Butterworths, Toronto, 1985) 246-247 . 
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examination of the arguments for freedom of expression shows that the argument 
from democracy is offended by the restriction imposed, but not necessarily the 
arguments from truth or self-fulfilment. The interest of the public in receiving 
information about the administration of justice by the courts is therefore the most 
significant interest involved. This will be important in determining how the 
competing interests involved in the sub judice rule should be balanced later in this 
paper. 
B Right to a Fair Trial 
There are several rights associated with the right to a fair trial. For present 
purposes the relevant right is contained in section 25(a) of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 which states that anyone charged with a criminal offence has "[t]he 
right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court". 
46 The 
relevant part of this right in the context of the sub judice rule is the right to a fair 
hearing by an impartial court. The Court of Appeal has stated that the assurance of 
this right is "essential for the preservation of an effective system of justice".
47 
There are three broad factors that contribute to a fair hearing- fair legal rules, 
fair exercise of judicial discretion and "good faith and competence of trial 
participants".
48 Publication of matters surrounding a criminal trial threatens the last 
factor as there is a fear that it has the potential to influence trial participants - usually 
jurors but in some instances judges and witnesses. If this occurs then trial participants 
may have preconceived notions, which may mean that the court that hears the case 
will be unable to act impartially. 
49 If the preconceived notions are that the accused is 
guilty of the offence then the accused will be denied the presumption of innocence, 
which is a critical right of the accused regardless of whether they are innocent or 
guilty. 50 Whether or not media coverage of criminal trials causes prejudice is 
examined later in this paper. The following paragraphs instead look at the practical 
46 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, s 25(a). 
47 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-Genera/, above n 5, 571 Richardson J for the Court. 
48 Paul Rishworth et al, above n 33, 664. 
49 Ibid, 673-675. 
50 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(c); Randall v R [2002] 1 WLR 2237, 2251
 (PC) Bingham 
LJ for the Court. 
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matters of who is responsible for ensuring that a fair trial occurs and to whom the 
benefit of a fair trial belongs. 
The first practical matter to address is to identify who bears the burden of 
ensuring that fair trials occur. While contempt orders are made by the courts it is the 
media who must ensure that their actions do not cause prejudice to a fair trial. The 
Bill of Rights Act applies only to acts done by a branch of government, or to acts 
done by others in the performance of a public function, power or duty conferred by 
law.51 This clearly covers the courts as they are the judicial branch of government 
and also encapsulates the police and the prosecution. It is more difficult to find that 
this includes the media. The media often exercise functions conferred by law but 
whether these are public functions will depend on the facts in any particular case. 52 
The better view is that in this context the burden of ensuring that fair trials occur falls 
to the courts, not the media, but the courts will restrict the actions of the media to 
discharge the burden. If a fair trial were to be prevented by prejudicial publicity it 
would not be possible to take a Bill of Rights action against the media.53 
The final matter to consider is who has the benefit of the right to a fair trial. 
The wording of the right in the Bill of Rights Act states that it applies to "[ e ]veryone 
who is charged with an offence".54 This suggests that it is a right that belongs to the 
accused, but not to the prosecution. It seems clear however that the right to a fair trial 
exists for both sides in a criminal trial. There are two ways to reach this conclusion. 
The first is by reference to the meaning of "fair". Fair can be seen as a 
"referential term", meaning that the fairness of a trial can only be determined by 
reference to the interests of both sides. 55 On this view a trial is not fair simply 
because it is not biased against the accused, rather there must be no disposition 
towards either side. 
51 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, s 3. 
52 Ransfield v Radio Network Ltd [2005] 1 NZLR 233 , para 70 (HC) Randerson J. 53 Andrew Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 
Welllington, 2005) 807. 
54 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, s 25 . 
55 Paul Rishworth et al, above n 33, 666. 
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The second way to find that there is a right to a fair trial for the prosecution as 
well as the accused is by reference to the common law right which existed prior to the 
enactment of the Bill of Rights Act and is not restricted by virtue of non-inclusion in 
the Act.56 A statement that this right is bilateral is found in Commissioner of Police v 
Ombudsman where McMullin J stated:
57 
It is plain enough that a "fair trial" embraces concepts of fairness to both sides ... [i]n 
the case of a criminal trial both the Crown and the accused are entitled to fairness 
because the ends of justice are served as much by the conviction of the guilty as they 
are by the acquittal of the innocent. 
The right to a fair trial is therefore a right which belongs to both sides and, in the 
context of the sub judice rule, is the duty of the courts to provide. 
C The Public Interest 
There are several categories of public interest which are commonly argued to 
exist in sub judice contempt cases. Notable interests are the interest of the public and 
victims in seeing that justice is done, the maintenance of public confidence in the 
justice system and public safety. These interests diverge on their relation to freedom 
of expression and the right to a fair trial. 
The interest of the public and victims in seeing that justice is done is best 
regarded as forming part of the right to a fair trial as opposed to a distinct interest. 
This approach reflects the fact that the prosecution in a criminal trial is representing 
the public, therefore a fair trial for the prosecution fulfils the public interest in seeing 
the guilty convicted. 58 
The interest in maintaining confidence in the justice system is however 
distinct from the right to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. 
Publications which prejudge issues before the court may cause the authority of the 
courts as the forum for settling legal disputes to be undermined. Sustained attacks by 
56 New Zealand Bill ofRights Act 1990, s 28. 
51 Commissioner of Police v Ombudsman [1988] 1 NZLR 385,405 (CA) McMullin J. 
58 R v Noonan [1956] NZLR 1021, 1027 (SC) Henry J. 
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the media on the judiciary may have the same effect. 59 Preventing this is at the heart 
of the contempt jurisdiction and therefore favours restriction of freedom of 
expression. 
The interest in protecting the public from harm is also engaged in some 
situations by the sub judice rule. An example of this is when a person who is accused 
of a violent crime has not yet been apprehended or has escaped from custody. 60 In 
this situation the interest of public safety would favour freedom of expression over the 
right of the accused to a fair trial. 
These public interests will be relevant in part V of this paper which examines 
the balance that should be struck between the competing interests. The following part 
sets the scene for this discussion by exploring whether the right to a fair trial is at risk 
if not protected by the sub judice rule, which will determine whether the different 
interests identified above need to be balanced against each other. 
IV IS SUB JUDICE CONTEMPT NECESSARY? 
The main justification for the law of sub judice contempt is that it is necessary 
in ensuring that those accused of a crime receive a fair trial. If the right to a fair trial 
is not threatened by media coverage, or if there are other ways of protecting the fair 
trial right without restricting media coverage, sub judice contempt will not be 
necessary. Identifying the appropriate balance between the interests will be irrelevant 
if this is the case. If media coverage does not have a prejudicial effect on jurors then 
for most categories of publication which sub judice contempt seeks to restrict there 
will be no need to balance the right to a fair trial against freedom of expression as the 
right to a fair trial will not be placed at risk. 
This section of the paper seeks to show that sub judice contempt is necessary. 
It does this by addressing the two key questions relevant to determining whether 
restriction of freedom of expression is needed to protect the right to a fair trial. The 
first question is whether media coverage of a trial actually causes prejudice in jurors. 
59 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 325-327. 
60 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 420. 
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The second question is whether there are alternative methods of protecting the right to 
a fair trial which do not involve restricting freedom of expression. 
After examining the research it is found that there is no clear answer to the 
first question but there is sufficient evidence to support the presumption made by the 
New Zealand courts in sub judice contempt cases that media coverage can prejudice 
jurors. In answer to the second question it is found that although there are alternatives 
to preventing publication, none of these alternatives provide a satisfactory substitute 
for sub judice contempt. It is therefore concluded that the use of sub judice contempt 
to restrict freedom of expression is necessary in order to provide for the right to a fair 
trial. The next question to answer is what approach should be taken in balancing the 
competing rights, the answer to which is found in the following section of the paper. 
A Does Publicity Cause Prejudice? 
To answer the question of whether publicity surrounding a criminal trial 
causes prejudice this section first examines the approach taken in New Zealand, with 
reference to what one High Court judge has called the "trail-blazing"
61 research 
undertaken by the New Zealand Law Commission in 1999. The approach taken by 
the courts before the Law Commission' s research is set out first, before the Law 
Commission' s research is examined and finally the reaction of the courts to the 
research is explored. 
Following this discussion the research that has been undertaken overseas is 
surveyed to determine whether there is a consensus. It is concluded that although 
there is no clear answer, there is enough evidence to allow the courts to continue to 
presume, in the context of sub judice contempt, that media coverage of criminal trials 
may cause prejudice. 
I The New Zealand approach 
(a) Before the Law Commission' s research 
61 Tukuafa v R (17 December 2001 ) HC AK A205/0l , para 17 Chambers J. 
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Before the Law Commission's research the courts declined to apply overseas 
research on the effects of publicity on a jury trial, preferring instead to rely on judicial 
experience.62 Judicial experience on the effect of media coverage seemed to diverge 
depending on the nature of the case at hand. 
An often cited passage is that of the Court of Appeal in R v Harawira. The 
issue in this case was whether prejudicial pre-trial publicity had deprived the appellant 
of a fair trial, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Richardson J, giving the judgment 
of the Court, stated:63 
Experience shows that juries are quite capable of understanding and carrying out their 
role in this environment, notwithstanding that an accused may have been the subject of 
widespread debate and criticism. A ready example - far removed from this case factually 
- is the way charges of serious violence against gang members are dealt with. 
Undoubtedly there is widespread prejudice against them, yet injuries still acquit or fail to 
agree on occasions, indicating that when confronted with an actual case, they can be 
expected to carry out their task responsibly in the light of the evidence. 
In the later case of Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General Richardson J, 
again giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal, noted that assumptions about 
prejudicial publicity have not been proven to be correct or incorrect in the New 
Zealand context:64 
We do not even know by an assessment of the outcomes of jury trials affecting gang 
members or those charged with sexual abuse or drug dealing or other kinds of offending 
assumed to be susceptible by publicity to generic or particular prejudice, whether those 
assumptions have been borne out. 
Gisborne Herald was an appeal by a newspaper against a finding that they were in 
contempt of court. Counsel for the appellant relied on overseas research to argue that 
there was no empirical evidence that pre-trial publicity had a prejudicial effect on jury 
trials. In responding to this the Court of Appeal noted that there were also studies 
62 See for example Solicitor-General v Wellington Newspapers Ltd, above n 13, 48 Eichelbaum CJ; 57 
McGechan J; Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 574-575 Richardson J for the 
Court. 
63 R v Harawira [1989] 2 NZLR 714, 729 (CA) Richardson J for the Court. 64 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 574 Richardson J for the Court. 
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which reached the opposite conclusion and held that in the absence of New Zealand 
data or guidance as to the application of overseas research to New Zealand juries the 
long standing judicial assumption that pre-trial publication could prejudice a fair trial 
would stand. 
65 
It is interesting to note that judicial opinion recognised that pre-trial publicity 
could prejudice a fair trial when the question arose in the lead up to a criminal trial, 
such as in Gisborne Herald, but preferred to rely on the ability of juries to remain 
objective when the question arose after conviction, such as in Harawira. 
(b) The New Zealand Law Commission's research 
(i) Method and conclusions 
The absence of New Zealand data on the effect of publicity on New Zealand 
juries was addressed by the New Zealand Law Commission in their Juries project. 
Over a period of nine months in 1998 the Law Commission researched several issues 
relating to juries in New Zealand, including the effect of publicity on jurors. The 
research was conducted by a pre-trial questionnaire and a post-trial interview with 
jurors in 48 jury trials (18 in the High Court and 30 in the District Court). The trials 
selected included all of the high profile cases in the nine month period and a 
significant number of complex cases. Both the questionnaires and interviews were 
voluntary, meaning that the total number of jurors interviewed was 312 out of the 
potential 575.66 
To study the effect of publicity jurors were asked whether they were aware of 
any publicity about the case either pre-trial or during the trial and whether the 
publicity had impacted on their thinking about the case.
67 From the responses to these 
questions the Law Commission found that the impact of pre-trial publicity was in 
most cases minimal
68 and that although the impact of publicity during the trial was 
65 Ibid, 575 Richardson J for the Court. 
66 New Zealand Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials Part Two: A Summary of the Research 
Findings (NZLC PP37(2), Wellington, 1999) 2 ["Juries Two"]. 
67 Ibid, 60. 
68 Ibid. 
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harder to ascertain, it was probably of limited impact and unlikely to affect the verdict 
reached by the jury. 69 
The factors that led the Law Commission to conclude that in most cases the 
impact of pre-trial publicity was minimal were that only 16 of the jurors in the sample 
could recall more than the "bare essentials" of their case from the publicity; that of 
those 16 jurors only two admitted that their knowledge had an initial impact on them; 
and that even if an individual juror was influenced by pre-trial publicity it was 
unlikely that this had an effect on the verdict reached by the jury collectively. 70 They 
based their finding that publicity during the trial was unlikely to have a large impact 
on the jurors' reasoning on the facts that most jurors who saw or heard publicity 
during the trial reported that they recognised that it was partial or inaccurate and 
therefore disregarded it, and that in three cases where jurors had tried to bring media 
reports of the case into the jury room they were told by other members of the jury that 
the information was not relevant.71 
It must be noted that the Law Commission did not conclude that publicity had 
no impact on jurors, rather that the level of publicity allowed by the sub judice rule 
had only a small impact. The Law Commission therefore argued that the sub judice 
rule was still necessary and should not be relaxed: 72 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the Research is that jurors are not 
generally affected by the current level of pre-trial or during-trial publicity ... it can be 
assumed that the more we permit pre-trial publicity, the more effect it will have on 
jurors, and the more we would move away from the current low-impact position. 
(ii) Limitations of the research 
A major limitation of the research done by the Law Commission is that it 
relies primarily on self-reports of jurors. 73 This raises two potential dangers - the 
jurors' responses may not have been honest, and even if responding honestly, the 
69 Ibid 61-62 
70 Ibid: 60-61 : 
71 Ibid 61 
72 Ne; Ze~land Law Commission Juries in Criminal Trials (NZLC R69, Wellington, 2001) 180. 
73 "Juries Two", above n 66, 5. 
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jurors may not have been able to accurately identify the extent to which publicity had 
influenced their reasoning. 
The Law Commission noted that it was possible that jurors would understate 
behaviours which were contrary to the directions of the judge. 
74 The jurors were 
aware that having reference to media coverage was not allowed. They therefore may 
not have been willing to admit to paying attention to media coverage. This factor 
means that although only two jurors out of the sample admitted to being influenced by 
publicity there may be others who were influenced but did not admit to it. Similarly, 
jurors may not have placed a greater weight on media coverage during the trial than 
they acknowledged in interviews. 
Even if the jurors in the sample all responded honestly their responses may not 
have been accurate as they may not have realised the impact that publicity had on 
their reasoning. This is illustrated by an American study in which potential jurors 
were surveyed regarding their knowledge of a high profile case, their opinion on 
whether the defendant was guilty and whether they thought they would be able to be 
impartial as a member of the jury. The study found that while there was a correlation 
between knowledge of the crime and perceived culpability of the defendant there was 
no correlation between perceived culpability of the defendant and willingness to 
admit impartiality. The authors therefore concluded that self-reports of impartiality 
could not be relied on. 
75 These findings mean that media coverage may have played a 
much greater role in the trials where jurors were aware of publicity than what the Law 
Commission concluded. 
Another limitation of the Law Commission's research is that it did not 
examine the level or nature of publicity that each case received. It does not appear 
that there were many truly high profile cases in the study - there were only four trials 
out of the 48 studied in which half or more of the jurors could recall any pre-trial 
publicity and only 16 jutots out of the sample of 312 could recall more than the basic 
74 Ibid. 
75 Gary Moran and Brian Cutler "The Prejudicial Impact of Pretrial Publicity" (1991) 21(5) Journal of 
Applied Social Psychology 345 . 
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facts of the case from the publicity. 76 The findings that publicity has little or no 
impact in most cases are therefore tempered by the fact that in most of the cases 
studied there was little or no publicity that the jurors could remember. This means 
that the findings may not apply to cases which receive a large amount of media 
coverage, or, as the type of publicity was not examined, coverage which is 
particularly prejudicial. It also means that the results of the research may not translate 
across time, as the results reflect the impact of the type and level of publicity in 1998, 
with nothing to enable a reader to compare this with the current level and type of 
media coverage. 
( c) The courts' response to the research 
Since the Law Commission's research was published it has at times been 
relied on by the courts as authority for the principle that pre-trial publicity has a 
minimal effect on jurors in most cases. In some cases more weight has been placed 
on the research than is perhaps appropriate given the above limitations, while in other 
cases the Court has taken the opposite approach and in one case has cautioned against 
placing undue reliance on the research. 
The first judicial reference to the research was the Court of Appeal decision R 
v Middleton77 and subsequent cases have cited this case as precedent for relying on 
the research. It is worth noting that Middleton did not actually apply the research and 
the Court's decision actually went against the research findings. Middleton was an 
application for leave to appeal against a pre-trial order for change of venue. 
Middleton had been charged with threatening to kill the man who murdered his step-
daughter and was due to be released on parole. The Crown had been granted the 
change of venue due to extensive pre-trial publicity that was favourable to the 
accused. Middleton was a high profile campaigner for law and order issues and had 
considerable public support in his community. There was extensive publicity in his 
area about the issues surrounding his trial. The Court of Appeal stated that the Law 
Commission's research showed "that the impact of media publicity both before and 
during trial is in almost all cases minimal and that the apprehension which sometimes 
76 "Juries Two", above n 66, 60. 
11 R v Middleton (26 September 2000) CA 218/00. 
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exists about the effect of publicity may be over-stated." 
78 Due to the umque 
circumstances of the case however the Court dismissed the appeal and stated that they 
would also have allowed the change of venue. 
79 
Cases following Middleton have relied on the Law Commission's research and 
in some cases have taken it as authority for propositions which it did not prove. In 
denying an application for extension of suppression orders the Court of Appeal in R v 
Burns ([ravis) (No 2) stated that the Law Commission research showed that even in 
high profile cases prejudicial media coverage has minimal impact. 
80 In R v Curtis 
where the appellant claimed he was denied the right to a fair trial because the trial 
judge refused to adjourn the trial after the broadcast of a television programme which 
portrayed the appellant as "dodgy" the Court of Appeal noted that the decision to 
broadcast the show was irresponsible and potentially contemptuous
81 but in finding 
that the appellant received a fair trial relied on the Law Commission's research as 
support for the statement that "concerns over pre-trial publicity have at times been 
over-rated".82 As has been examined above it is questionable whether the research 
can be said to apply to high profile cases and the research does not extend to allowing 
prejudicial media coverage that would be subject to sub judice contempt proceedings. 
Not all cases have placed significant weight on the Law Commission's 
research in making their findings. In R v Cara Potter J warned against placing undue 
reliance on the research in light of the limitations to the research, and in particular the 
fact that only 48 trials were studied. 
83 The Court of Appeal has referred to the 
research with approval since this case however, for instance in R v Curtis, so this is 
far from being accepted judicial opinion. 
78 Ibid, para 12 Robertson J for the Court. 
79 Ibid, para 36 Robertson J for the Court. 
80 R v Bums (Travis) (No 2) [2002] 1 NZLR 410, 413 (CA) Richardson P for the Court. 
81 R v Curtis (10 August 2006) CA 224/06, paras 27-29 Chambers J for the Court. 
82 Ibid, para 16 Chambers J for the Court. 
83 R v Cara (30 July 2004) HC AK CRI 2004-004-006560, paras 70-72 Potter J. 
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In other cases, rather than explicitly rejecting the research the courts have 
reverted to relying on judicial experience. This experience however, like when it was 
relied on previously, is not always consistent.84 
The reaction of the courts to the Law Commission's research has been mixed. 
While it appears that the courts have been willing to rely on the research to show that 
the impact of publicity on the right to a fair trial is minimal it should be noted that in 
the cases where this has been relied on the issue has arisen after the trial. This 
approach is therefore similar to the approach taken in these cases before the research, 
where the courts relied on judicial experience to find that juries were capable of 
operating impartially despite publicity. In cases such as Middleton, where the 
question arose before the trial, the courts have continued to take a cautious approach 
to protecting the right to a fair trial. 
(d) What conclusions can be made from the New Zealand approach? 
The principles that can be derived from the cases involving potentially 
prejudicial publicity are that when the question of the impact of publicity arises before 
a trial, for instance in sub judice contempt cases, the court will presume that there is a 
potential impact and will therefore safeguard a fair trial, while when the question 
arises after a trial the court will presume that jurors were not prejudiced by publicity. 
While this seems inconsistent the approaches may be reconciled simply by reference 
to the existence of the court's jurisdiction to punish for sub judice contempt. 
When the issue anses before a trial the court will restrict publication of 
matters that may cause prejudice to a trial. This in turn has the effect of preventing 
the media from publishing information which may cause prejudice to a trial, in order 
to avoid the possibility of contempt proceedings. When the issue arises after a trial 
the court can therefore presume that the publicity that has occurred will not have 
caused prejudice to a trial as publicity that falls within the sub judice rule will have 
been prevented. This is consistent with the Law Commission's research which 
suggests that media coverage which falls within the range acceptable under the sub 
84 Compare for example R v H (30 June 2006) HC AK CRl-2005-419-122, para 17 Heath J and R v 
Rickards (28 November 2005) HC AK CRl 2005-063-1122, para 97 Randerson J. 
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judice rule does not cause prejudice. In cases where publicity of a prejudicial nature 
has nevertheless occurred, the court can assess the actual effects of the publicity, 
rather than looking at the likely effects as is the approach in sub judice cases. 
85 
2 Overseas research 
There is a large amount of overseas research as to whether media coverage of 
a trial causes juror prejudice. It is not possible to draw clear conclusions from the 
body of research for several reasons: the lack of uniformity of the findings; 
methodological limitations; and jurisdictional differences. There are however 
sufficient indications in the research that media coverage may cause prejudice to 
justify the retention of sub judice contempt. 
This section of the paper explains the limitations of the research and then 
explores two persuasive studies which may overcome the limitations. Other findings 
relating to the different effect of different types of publicity are then briefly 
mentioned, before concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the 
presumption made by the courts in sub judice contempt cases that publicity may 
prevent a fair trial. 
(a) Limitations of the research 
The first problem with drawing a conclusion on whether publicity causes 
prejudice in jurors from the overseas research is the lack of uniformity in the findings. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission has stated that the studies "fall 
almost equally into opposite camps in the conclusions they reach" and that even 
within each "camp" the research outcomes are not always consistent. 
86 Tellingly, 
there is not even consensus on this divergence, with some commentators arguing that 
85 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 333-334. 
86 New South Wales Law Reform Commission Contempt by Publication (Discussion Pa
per 43, Sydney, 
2000), para 2.66. 
30 
the majority of the evidence supports the conclusion that publicity causes prejudice87 
and others arguing the opposite.88 
This difference in interpretation of the research is perhaps due to the different 
values placed on free speech, with authors arguing for a greater protection of free 
speech more likely to find that the research supports their view. 89 One text arguing 
that this is the case finds that the New Zealand Law Commission's research discussed 
above is the "most significant in recent years" and states that this research has 
"serious implications" for sub judice contempt, 90 even though the Law Commission 
expressly stated that this was not the case.91 Misinterpretations such as this mean that 
research findings must be treated with care. 
A further problem with drawing conclusions from the research is that a large 
amount of the overseas research suffers from methodological limitations. Most of the 
overseas research falls into one of two groups - "field studies" which draw on media 
coverage of real life cases and assess the potential impact of the coverage by use of 
surveys or interviews, and "experimental studies" which use trial simulations to gauge 
the effect of various levels and types of fictional examples of media coverage. 92 Each 
of these methods has significant limitations, mostly relating to the lack of 
resemblance to actual juror experience. 
In field study approaches the subjects are usually exposed to publicity and 
then asked about their opinion of the defendant's guilt or innocence. The immediacy 
with which this occurs differs from actual trials, where there will often be weeks or 
months between the jurors being exposed to publicity and the trial. 93 In both field 
studies and experimental studies the atmosphere in which the subjects are asked to 
give an opinion is less formal than in actual trials, meaning that the subjects may not 
87 See for example Solomon M Fulero "The Role of Behavioral Research in the Free Press/Fair Trial 
Controversy: Another View" (1987) 11 Law and Human Behavior 259, 262; Norbert L Kerr "The 
Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors" (1994) 78 Judicature 120. 
88 See for example Rita J Simon ''Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the 
Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors ofNews Coverage?" (1976-77) 29 Stan L Rev SIS, 528. 89 See for example Ian Cram, above n 36, 116-120; Rita J Simon, above n 88, 528. 
90 Ian Cram, above n 36, 119-120. 
91 New Zealand Law Commission, above n 72, 180. 
92 T M Honess et al "Empirical and Legal Perspectives on the Impact of Pre-trial Publicity" [2002) 
Crim LR 719, 721-722. 
93 Ian Cram, above n 36, 117. 
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take as much care in their deliberation as actual jurors do. 
94 Finally, experimental 
studies are criticised as not being representative of actual jurors as they are commonly 
composed solely of members of certain groups - usually university students. 
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The final problem with drawing a conclusion from the overseas research in 
relation to publicity in New Zealand is the very fact that it comes from overseas. 
Most of the research comes from the United States, which has a very different media 
culture. Publicity surrounding criminal trials in the United States is significantly 
different in terms of both volume and content to the publicity in New Zealand.% This 
means that there may be a difference between how prejudicial American publicity is 
and how prejudicial New Zealand publicity is. 
There are two studies of note that overcome some of these limitations. The 
following discussion explores these studies and their findings. Other studies are then 
briefly looked to in order to derive some principles about the effect of different types 
of publications. 
(b) Overcoming problems of uniformity and method - a meta-analytic review 
A 1999 American study compared the results of 44 empirical tests for the 
impact of pre-trial publicity.
97 The 44 tests were conducted between 1966 and 1997 
and involved a total of 5755 subjects. The tests reached different conclusions as to 
whether exposing jurors to negative pre-trial publicity would be produce more guilty 
verdicts than if the jurors were not exposed to the publicity - 23 tests finding that 
there would be more guilty verdicts, 20 tests finding that there would be no significant 
difference and one test finding that there would be less guilty verdicts. The tests 
suffered from different degrees of methodological problems. 
To remedy the inconsistency in the conclusions and the methodological 
problems the authors of the study conducted a meta-analytic review of the tests. 
94 Rita J Simon, above n 88, 520. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Michael Chesterman et al Managing Prejudicial Publicity: An Empirical Study of Criminal Jury 
Trials in New South Wales (Law and Justice Foundation of New South Wales, Sydney, 2001) 22-23 . 
97 Nancy Steblay et al "The Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review" 
(1999) 23 Law and Human Behavior 219. 
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Greater weight was given to tests which used members of the potential juror pool as 
subjects, used real pre-trial publicity, involved the types of crimes that generally 
receive widespread publicity, and had a greater length of time between exposure to 
publicity and judgment. 98 
From this analysis several conclusions were made. The first was that jurors 
who are exposed to negative publicity about the defendant or the crime are more 
likely to return a guilty verdict than those who are not exposed to the publicity. 99 The 
next was that prejudice caused by negative publicity was most influential before the 
trial, but the effect of negative publicity continued through until after the trial and 
after jury deliberation.100 The final conclusion was that the evidence gathered by all 
of the tests converged to justify the finding that pre-trial publicity has a substantial 
effect on jurors. 101 
This study is persuasive as it overcomes the problems of lack of uniformity 
and methodological limitations. It gives a strong indication that publicity can 
influence jurors against the defendant and therefore potentially deprive the defendant 
of the presumption of innocence. 
(c) Overcoming problems of method and jurisdiction - New South Wales research 
An example of a study that overcomes the methodological limitations of other 
studies and was conducted in an environment similar to New Zealand is the research 
undertaken from 1997 to 2000 by the Law and Justice Foundation of New South 
Wales. 102 This research involved interviewing jurors, judges and counsel for the 
prosecution and defence involved in 41 criminal trials. Two specific aspects of 
publicity were examined - the ability of the jury to recall the publicity and whether 
the publicity influencedjurors. 
98 Ibid, 228. 
99 Ibid, 229. 
lOO Ibid, 229. 
10 1 Ibid, 230. 
102 Michael Chesterman et al, above n 96. 
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In respect of juror recall of information it was found that in all of the cases that 
were studied at least one juror followed media coverage of the trial. Jurors were more 
likely to remember general themes of publicity than specific details. Of the specific 
details that were remembered, details of the crime were most likely to be 
remembered, followed by details of the arrest and of pre-trial proceedings. Overall, 
jurors were most likely to remember media coverage of the trial if the defendant was 
well-known in the community, the crime occurred in their local area, or if their first 
exposure to the publicity was after the trial began. 
103 
To establish the level of influence that publicity had on jurors the researchers 
looked at whether the jurors identified the relevant issues that the judge and counsel 
thought should be considered, and examined whether the jury's verdict was 
determined by the publicity. It was found that juries were able to identify the relevant 
issues when the evidence led clearly to a conclusion as to the defendant's guilt, but 
were less successful at identifying the relevant issues when the evidence was 
equivocal. The researchers found that that in three of the 40 trials where a verdict was 
returned it was likely that publicity had determined the verdict, and it was possible 
that this had happened in a further seven trials. In 11 trials it was likely that publicity 
had influenced the jurors but had not influenced their verdict, and it was possible that 
this had happened in a further five trials. That left 14 trials where it was not possible 
that jurors had been influenced, of which six had not been covered by the media. 
104 
The researchers then assessed whether the verdicts reached by the juries were 
safe. They did this by asking the judge, the defence counsel and the prosecution 
counsel involved in each case whether they felt that the jury's verdict was justified 
based on the evidence presented in court. In 30 of the trials all of the parties agreed 
that the jury's verdict was safe, in 8 trials the defence counsel felt the verdict was 
unsafe and in two trials two or more of the parties felt that the verdict was unsafe. 
The verdicts that were felt by at least one party to be unsafe were all in line with the 
tone of the publicity which the cases received. 
105 
103 Ibid, xiv-xv. 
104 Ibid, xvi-xviii. 
ios Ibid, xvi-xviii. 
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In light of these findings the researchers concluded that jurors in New South 
Wales were generally resistant to the influence of media coverage. They noted 
however that this resistance was partly attributed to the sub judice rule which 
prevented jurors from being exposed to any highly prejudicial publicity close to the 
time of the trial. 106 The researchers therefore explicitly stated that their findings did 
not support arguments for reducing restrictions on media coverage of criminal 
trials. 107 
This research overcomes the methodological limitations faced by other studies 
by interviewing participants in actual trials. It was conducted in a context much 
closer to the New Zealand environment than American studies. It is therefore 
persuasive evidence that jurors may be influenced, but in the most part are not 
affected, by a limited amount of pre-trial publicity. Similarly to the New Zealand 
Law Commission research, the New South Wales research finds that the sub judice 
rule should be retained. 
( d) Some findings relating to specific kinds of publicity 
Other studies offer some indications as to what kinds of publicity are 
particularly prejudicial. Although these studies face the limitations discussed above, 
their findings on comparative effects of publicity may be of use as the comparisons 
occur within the same research framework. 
Studies have shown that some types of publicity are "especially damaging" to 
Juror impartiality. 108 Publicity which is specific to the particular case is more 
damaging than generic publicity - which discusses social issues involved in the case 
but not the case itself. 109 Publicity which indicates culpability of the defendant (for 
instance details of confessions or of prior criminal records) is more likely to cause 
prejudice than bare details of the offence and the larger the concentration of 
106 Ibid, xxi. 
107 Ibid, xxii. 
108 Jonathon L Freedman and Tara M Burke "The Effect of Pretrial Publicity: the Bernardo Case" 
(1996) Canadian Journal of Criminology 253, 267. 
109 Edith Greene "Media Effects on Jurors" (1990) 14 Law and Human Behavior 439, 441 . 
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prejudicial factors in an article, the more likely it is to cause prejudice.
11° Finally, 
emotive reporting is much more prejudicial than factual reporting, and has the effect 
of influencing jurors exposed to the reporting, and of making those jurors more 
· · th · Ill persuasive m e Jury room. 
These findings all support the distinctions made in the operation of the sub 
judice rule. The kinds of publicity which are identified as particularly prejudicial 
would all fall outside the bounds of what is allowable to publish without being found 
liable for sub judice contempt. 
(e) What does the overseas research mean for sub judice contempt? 
Given the limitations of the overseas research no clear answer can be found to 
the question of whether publicity influences jurors. It has not been conclusively 
proven either way. There is however sufficient evidence to justify the presumption 
made by the courts in sub judice cases that publicity may cause prejudice. 
3 Conclusion - courts can assume that publicity may cause prejudice 
In sub judice contempt cases the courts presume that sub judice contempt may 
interfere with the right to a fair trial. The courts therefore prevent publication of 
information which they deem to be particularly prejudicial. While neither the 
research conducted by the New Zealand Law Commission or the overseas research 
conclusively proves that this presumption is justified, there is a body of evidence 
which supports the presumption. As the arguments for free speech assume that 
speech has the power to influence, the burden must be on those arguing that speech in 
the context of criminal trials does not have an influence to prove that this is the 
case.112 This burden has not yet been met. 
B Are there Alternative Measures for Protecting Trials? 
110 Norbert L Kerr, above n 87, 122. 
111 T M Honess et al, above n 92, 723 . 
112 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 323. 
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In light of the findings above, sub judice contempt will be necessary to protect 
trials unless there are alternative feasible measures which can effectively combat juror 
prejudice. Alternative measures do exist and are commonly used in the United States 
and Canada. 113 Possible measures include instructions to the jury, sequestration, 
adjournment, venue change and questioning potential jurors. The New Zealand Court 
of Appeal has rejected reliance on these methods, stating that they do not provide 
adequate protection against prejudicial publicity. 114 
This section assesses the efficacy of the alternative measures for protecting a 
trial which do not involve restricting freedom of expression. It finds that the Court of 
Appeal was correct to caution against undue reliance on these methods as they are of 
questionable value and impose heavy costs on the criminal justice system. 
1 Possible alternative measures 
(a) Instructions to the jury 
The most convenient measure to protect a fair trial from prejudicial publicity 
is judicial instruction to the jury to disregard any media coverage of the trial and 
decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court. Although this measure 
entails no extra cost or inconvenience it is not clear that it is effective. 
The New Zealand courts have expressed different opinions as to the usefulness 
of directions. In R v H, an application for a stay of proceedings due to pre-trial 
publicity, Heath J stated that he would not be inclined to issue a direction to ignore 
the publicity complained of in the circumstances of the case because it may remind 
the jurors of the publicity and actively make them consider it. 115 Randerson J took a 
different approach in R v Rickards, another application for a stay of proceedings, 
stating: 116 
113 Ibid, 331. 
114 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 575 Richardson J for the Court. 
115 R v H, above n 84, para 22 Heath J. 
116 R v Rickards, above n 84, para 97 Randerson J. 
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It is not to be assumed that jurors ignore judicial directions to put to one side matters 
they may have heard outside the Court . . . experience shows that jurors are 
responsive to judicial directions of that kind. 
Research on the efficacy of directions favours the approach taken by Heath J, 
suggesting that they may actually highlight the issues that the judge warns the jury to 
ignore, particularly in complex cases. 
117 Other studies conclude that jury instructions 
are largely ignored118 and have no success in eliminating juror bias.
119 It has also 
been argued that despite their best endeavours jurors lack the cognitive control to 
deliberately disregard "emotionally arousing material", so a judicial direction will not 
be able to overcome the effect of such material.
120 
Randerson J's suggestion that jurors are responsive to judicial directions may 
therefore be inaccurate. The research suggests that jurors are likely to disregard 
directions and, even if directions are followed, jurors may be unable to restrict their 
judgement to matters before the court. 
(b) Sequestration 
Sequestration involves isolating the jury for the duration of the trial to prevent 
them from seeing or hearing anything about the case. There are obvious practical 
difficulties with sequestration. In Gisborne Herald Richardson J stated it "would add 
to the pressures on jurors and affect their ordinary lives".
121 Sequestering the jury 
also involves considerable expense for the state. 
122 
It is doubtful whether sequestration is an effective means to protect a trial. 
Sequestration does not prevent potential jurors from being exposed to publicity before 
117 Stephen J Krause "Punishing the Press: Using Contempt of Court to Secure the Right to a Fair 
Trial" (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 537, 564. 
11 8 Joseph R Mariniello "The Death Penalty and Pre-Trial Publicity: Are Today' s Attempts at 
Guaranteeing a Fair Trial Adequate? (1994) 8 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol'y 371, 383 . 
119 Newton N Minow and Fred H Cate "Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?" (I 990-
1991) 40 AM UL Rev 631 , 648. 
120 Geoffrey P. Kramer et al "Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias" (1990) 14 Law and 
Human Behavior 409, 412. 
121 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 575 Richardson J for the Court. 
122 Michael Chesterman "OJ and the Dingo: How Media Publicity Relating to Criminal Cases Tried by 
Jury is Dealt With in Australia and America" (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law 109, 
135 . 
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they are selected for the trial. It therefore cannot counteract prejudicial pre-trial 
publicity. 123 It is also suggested that sequestration may impair the jury's ability to 
deliberate dispassionately about the case, either because of the extra pressure that is 
imposed, 124 or because long periods of sequestration may cause the jury to resent the 
defendant. 125 
( c) Adjournment 
Adjournment delays the trial to allow the effects of prejudicial publicity to 
diminish. This conflicts with the right of the accused to be tried without undue 
delay. 126 It has been argued that the breach of this right is overcome because it is 
usually the accused who is requesting the adjournment127 but this ignores the fact that, 
if not for the publicity, the accused would not need to request a delay. 
Adjournment may not achieve the objective of reducing potential juror 
prejudice. Delaying the trial may remedy the effects of purely factual publicity but it 
has been found that when the publicity has an emotional effect the effect will not be 
diminished by a delay. 128 The type of publicity that has surrounded a particular case 
would therefore need to be examined before adjournment were relied on and this 
would not prevent emotive reporting from occurring before the trial and having a 
lasting effect on potential jurors. 
Even if adjournment did successfully remedy the effect of prejudicial 
publicity, it poses other risks to the trial. Delaying the trial increases the possibility 
that evidence will be lost before the trial or that the memories of witnesses will 
fade. 129 Adjournment therefore seems to be an unsatisfactory solution to the problem 
of prejudicial publicity. 
( d) Change of venue 
123 Joseph R Mariniello, above n 118, 375. 
124 Michael Chesterman, above n 122, 135. 
125 Stephen J Krause, above n 117, 565 . 
126 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(b). 
127 Joseph R Mariniello, above n 118, 375. 
128 Stephen J Krause, above n 117, 565 . 
129 Joseph R Mariniello, above n 118, 376. 
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Venue changes move the trial to another area. This may be successful where 
there has been a large degree of local publicity about a crime, but will not be effective 
where there has been widespread national publicity. 
130 Given the small size of New 
Zealand and the popularity of internet news sites this may mean that there are very 
few situations where a change of venue will be useful. This is reflected in the small 
number of change of venue applications received by the courts. 
131 
Where a change of venue is appropriate there are other problems with its use. 
In Gisborne Herald the Court of Appeal stated that New Zealand courts "have always 
taken the view that there is a particular public interest in trying cases in the 
community where the alleged crime occurred". 
132 Changes of venue are also 
expensive, and cause inconvenience for those involved in the trial. 
133 
( e) Questioning potential jurors 
There are several ways that potential jurors can be questioned before being 
selected for the jury to ensure that they have not been prejudiced by publicity. These 
methods are called voir dire, challenges for cause and examination for cause. Using 
these methods jurors may be questioned by the judge or by counsel and the 
questioning may consist of a few brief questions or a detailed interrogation. 
134 The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal has held that judicial discretion to allow these methods 
should only exercised in exceptional cases. 
135 
Questioning potential jurors before selection is unlikely to be successful at 
achieving a jury consisting solely of persons who have not been prejudiced by 
publicity. One reason for this is that it is unlikely a prejudiced potential juror would 
be able to recognise their own prejudice. 
136 Even if the prejudice was identified, 
studies indicate that potential jurors may be unlikely to admit to their prejudices when 
130 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 331-332. 
131 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 575 Richardson J for the Court. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Michael Chestennan, above n 122, 131 . 
135 R v Sanders [1995] 3 NZLR 545, 550 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
136 Gary Moran and Brian Cutler, above n 75, 345; Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94, 103-104 Mason CJ 
and Toohey J. 
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questioned as they may seek to give the answer that they believe the judge or counsel 
questioning them wants to hear, out of a desire to please or to secure a spot on the 
jury.137 
These methods may also prevent well-informed citizens from being selected 
for a Jury. In the United States, where these methods are commonly used, 
commentators argue that their use results in the courts selecting jurors who may not 
be equipped to undertake the kind of deliberation required in criminal cases. This is 
because there is a tendency to choose jurors with absolutely no knowledge of the case, 
meaning that well-informed, and arguably more intelligent, people are rejected while 
"ignorant" people are selected for the jury.138 
2 Conclusion on alternative measures 
The above examination of the possible alternative measures to combat juror 
prejudice reveals that none are a satisfactory substitute for preventing prejudicial 
publications. Instructions to the jury are likely to be ignored and even if followed 
they may be impossible for jurors to comply with. Sequestration cannot combat the 
effects of pre-trial publicity and involves a large amount of expense and 
inconvenience. Adjournment may be effective to remedy purely factual prejudicial 
information but does not diminish the effect of emotional publications. It also 
deprives the accused person of their right to be tried without undue delay. Changes of 
venue cause unnecessary expense and will not be effective where there has been 
widespread publicity of a case. Finally, the likes of voir dire are not likely to be 
successful and may prevent well-informed citizens from participating in juries. 
C Conclusion - Sub Judice Contempt is Necessary 
Research on whether publicity causes prejudice has not shown that prejudice 
1s not caused, meaning that the presumption made by the courts in sub judice 
contempt cases that publicity may cause prejudice has not been rebutted. The various 
alternative methods to protect fair trials are all either ineffective or have serious 
137 Newton N Minow and Fred H Cate, above n 119, 651. 
138 Stephen J Krause, above n 117, 567-568. 
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practical difficulties. In light of this, sub judice contempt is necessary in order to 
safeguard the right to a fair trial. 
This conclusion justifies imposing limits on freedom of expression. The next 
question to address is in what circumstances freedom of expression should and should 
not be limited. Answering this question requires determining what balance should be 
struck between freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial and the public interest. 
V BALANCE TO BE STRUCK BETWEEN THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS 
In Gisborne Herald the Court of Appeal noted that: 
139 
[T]he complex process of balancing the values underlying free expression and fair 
trial rights may vary from country to country, even though there is a common and 
genuine commitment to international human rights norms. The balancing will be 
influenced by the culture and values of the particular community. 
In light of this observation this section explores the different balances that are 
achieved in various jurisdictions and seeks to identify what the appropriate approach 
is in the New Zealand context with respect to the sub judice rule. 
This section starts by examining when and how the interests examined in part 
III conflict in sub judice cases and then looks to the possible approaches to balancing 
the interests. The different approaches are examined in order of the significance they 
place on the fair trial right, starting from a presumption that freedom of expression 
will defeat the right to a fair trial in most instances and moving through to the position 
that fair trial rights are always paramount. Examples are given of when each 
approach has been taken in different jurisdictions and the merits of each approach are 
examined before concluding that in sub judice contempt cases in the New Zealand 
context the best approach is the one which gives the right to a fair trial the most 
protection. 
A Do the Interests Conflict? 
139 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 573 Richardson J for the Court. 
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With respect to freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial the above 
question has been answered by section IV of this paper - it seems clear that these 
interests do conflict when the media seeks to publish information which may have a 
prejudicial effect on a trial. It must be noted however that these two rights are often 
compatible. This is seen by reference to the argument from democracy as a 
justification for freedom of expression - the media provide a check against abuse of 
judicial power140 - and is reflected in the Bill of Rights Act which contains the right to 
a public hearing alongside the right to a fair hearing. 141 Where the rights do conflict 
the issue becomes how they can both best be accommodated under the Bill of Rights 
Act.142 
The public interest can either conflict or coincide with freedom of expression 
and the right to a fair trial. 143 The maintenance of public confidence in the 
administration of justice will coincide with the right to a fair trial but conflict with 
freedom of expression where a publication tends to undermine the authority of the 
courts. The interest of public safety has the opposite relationship with the rights -
supporting freedom of expression and conflicting with the right to a fair trial where 
the safety of the community will be protected by the publication of details of a 
potentially dangerous person in their midst. 
Due to the various relationships that the different interests have with each 
other there is no straightforward answer as to which should be given more weight 
with respect to media coverage of criminal trials. The following section explores the 
different possible solutions to this problem. 
B The Possible Approaches 
I Protecting freedom of expression 
The first possible approach is to protect freedom of expression and leave the 
protection of the right to a fair trial up to remedies other than suppressing media 
140 Eric Barendt, above n 34,313. 
141 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(a). 
142 Gisbome Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 571 Richardson J for the Court. 
143 See Part III C The Public Interest. 
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coverage. This is the approach favoured in the United States. In Nebraska Press 
Association v Stuart the Supreme Court found that restraining the media from 
publishing information which strongly implicated an accused facing trial was 
presumptively unconstitutional. The Court held that there was nothing at all that 
could stop the media from reporting on happenings within a court room. 
144 
Publication of other matters could not be restricted solely on the basis that publication 
would impair the defendant's right to a fair trial,
145 rather publication could only be 
restricted if the trial court could meet a very heavy burden of showing that no 
alternative measures would protect the defendant's rights.
146 Taking this approach 
means that the Supreme Court is more likely to reverse a conviction rendered unsafe 
by the level of prejudicial publicity surrounding the case than prevent the publication 
from occurring in the first place, 
147 an approach which would likely be met with some 
distaste in New Zealand.
148 
An approach favouring freedom of expression is taken in other jurisdictions in 
respect of publications which discuss public affairs. Section 5 of the United Kingdom 
Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides that a publication which forms part of a 
genuine discussion of public affairs is not to be treated as contempt if the risk of 
prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the discussion. 
149 
This approach looks more to the circumstances in which the right to a fair trial is 
threatened than to the actual threat imposed. By doing this freedom of expression and 
the public interest are prioritised over the right to a fair trial when a publication causes 
prejudice in an incidental way, even if that prejudice is substantial. 
150 
In Australia this approach was taken with respect to the discussion of public 
affairs for the 50 years following 1937 as a result of Ex parte Bread Manufacturers 
144 Nebraska Press Association v Stuart (1976) 427 US 539, 567-568 Burger CJ for the Court. 
145 Ibid, 562-563 Burger CJ for the Court. 
146 Ibid, 563-565 Burger CJ for the Court. 
147 See for example Sheppard v Maxwell (1966) 384 US 333 . 
148 See Don Mathias "The Accused's Right to a Fair Trial: Absolute or Limitable?" (2005] NZ Law 
Rev 217, 237-248. 
149 Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), s 5. 
tso See for example Attorney General v English [1983] 1 AC 116 (HL). 
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Ltd; re Truth and Sportsman Ltd. In his judgment Jordan CJ in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court held: 151 
The discussion of public affairs and the denunciation of public abuses, actual or 
supposed, cannot be required to be suspended merely because the discussion or the 
denunciation may, as an incidental but not intended by-product, cause some 
likelihood of prejudice to a person who happens at the time to be a litigant. 
Although this was a civil case the same reasoning was held to apply to later criminal 
cases152 until the approach was rejected by the High Court of Australia in Hinch v 
Attorney-General for the State of Victoria.153 
Taking an approach which balances the scales of justice firmly in favour of 
freedom of expression, such as that taken in the United States, does not accord with 
the rationale behind sub judice contempt. Taking this approach in relation to some 
forms of publication - for instance those which discuss public affairs - but not other 
publications seems inconsistent. The rights involved may be affected in the same way 
whether the publication discusses public affairs or not, so to reach a different balance 
of rights based purely on this factor may not be justifiable. The "incidental by-
product" test seems to look more at the context of the publication than at the actual 
effects on the rights involved. Discussion of public affairs may well be of the highest 
importance in some situations, but there will surely be situations where the discussion 
has little, if any, value. 
2 Balancing the rights 
This next approach addresses the deficiencies of focussing on the context of 
the publication instead of the effects on the relevant rights faced by the approach 
discussed above. This approach involves balancing the rights against each other and 
has found favour in Canada and Australia. There is also a suggestion in the Gisborne 
Herald case that this approach may be taken in New Zealand. 
151 Ex parte Bread Manufacturers Ltd; re Troth and Sportsman Ltd (1937) 37 SR(NSW) 242, 249-250 
(NSWSC) Jordan CJ. 
152 John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v Mcrae (1955) 93 CLR 351, 372 Dixon CJ, Fullager, Kitto and Taylor 
JJ. 
153 Hinch v Attorney-Genera/for the State of Victoria (1987) 164 CLR 15, 52-53 Deane J. 
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In the leading Canadian case on publication bans Dagenais v Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation the Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law 
rule which existed before the enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the Charter) and automatically favoured the right to a fair trial over 
freedom of expression was inconsistent with the Charter. This was because the 
Charter gives equal status to the right to a fair trial and to freedom of expression and 
therefore the majority felt that it would be inappropriate to continue to automatically 
favour a particular right. 1
54 The correct approach was rather to balance whether "the 
salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free 
expression of those affected by the ban". 
155 
A similar approach was taken by the High Court of Australia in Hinch v 
Attorney-General for the State of Victoria. This was a contempt case in which a radio 
broadcaster (Hinch) made several highly prejudicial statements about a former 
Catholic priest who was facing a range of sexual assault charges. Deane J stated that 
the issue to determine was "whether the view that detriment [to the accused's right to 
a fair trial] was outweighed by countervailing public interest considerations was 
reasonably open". If the view was reasonably open then contempt could not be 
found. 156 While Hinch's appeal against the contempt charge was dismissed it was 
noted that in some situations the interest in freedom of expression could outweigh the 
interest in a fair trial.
157 
In Gisborne Herald the New Zealand Court of Appeal suggested that it may 
be appropriate to balance the rights against each other, stating: 
158 
[I]n some cases publications for which free expression rights are claimed may affect 
the right to a fair trial. In those cases the impact of any intrusion, its proportionality 
to any benefits achieved under free expression values, and any measures reasonably 
available to prevent or minimise the risks occasioned by the intrusion and so 
simultaneously ensuring protection of both free expression and fair trial rights, 
should all be assessed. 
154 Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) 120 DLR (4th) 12, 37 (SCC) Lamer CJC. 
155 Ibid, 38 (SCC) Lamer CJC. 
156 Hinch v Attorney-General for the State of Victoria, above n 153, 51 Deane J. 
157 Ibid, 25 Mason J. 
158 Gisborne Herald Co Ltd v Solicitor-General, above n 5, 574 Richardson J for the Court. 
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Whether the Court actually accepted the balancing approach is however cast into 
doubt by later statements, as will be explained below. 
The balancing approach adopted in Australia and Canada is attractive in that it 
gives equal value to the rights involved and attempts to allow both rights to be 
exercised to the greatest possible extent. It may not be appropriate to suggest, as the 
High Court of Australia did in Hinch, that it will ever be acceptable to give an 
accused anything less than a fair trial, even if there is an overwhelming interest in 
freedom of expression. If this approach is taken it may need to be accepted that in 
cases where there is a large amount of interest or where matters are raised that need 
urgent public discussion the accused will not be able to be tried. If this occurs the 
public interest in seeing offenders brought to justice is clearly not served. 
3 Protecting the right to a fair trial when there is a significant risk 
Following on from the argument above it may be argued that, unlike freedom 
of expression, the right to a fair trial cannot be balanced against. This is because 
while freedom of expression is a right against undue interference with expression, 159 
the right to a fair trial is a "minimum standard" 160 right which cannot be limited. 161 
This approach is seen to some extent by the approach of the New Zealand courts in 
protecting fair trial rights in sub judice contempt cases where there is a significant risk 
of prejudice. 
In Gisborne Herald, following the passage quoted earlier, the Court of Appeal 
stated that the presumption in sub judice cases will be to protect fair trials, taking an 
approach similar to that rejected by the Canadian Supreme Court in Dagenais: 
(W]here on the conventional analysis freedom of expression and fair trial rights 
cannot both be fully assured, it is appropriate in our free and democratic society to 
temporarily curtail freedom of media expression so as to guarantee a fair trial. 
1s9 Eric Barendt, above n 34, 7. 
160 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25 . 
161 Don Mathias, above n 148, 217. 
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A clearer affmnation of the principle that the right to a fair trial cannot be 
balanced against is found in R v Burns (Travis) where the Court of Appeal stated: 
162 
The public's right to receive information, the principle of open justice, the type of 
information in question, its public importance and interest, its likely circulation, 
methods of diluting its effect on the minds of potential jurors, the presumption of 
innocence, and other issues are all to be balanced against its prejudicial effect. But 
once this exercise has been completed and it has been determined that there is a 
significant risk that the accused will not receive a fair trial, the issue ceases to be one 
of balancing. 
The principles of freedom of expression and open justice must then be departed from; 
not balanced against. There is no room in a civilised society to conclude that, "on 
balance", an accused should be compelled to face an unfair trial. 
While this approach gives priority to protecting fair trials it has been argued 
that this does not go far enough. This is because the requirement that there is a 
"significant risk" to a fair trial is potentially a very high threshold to meet. 
163 Because 
of this the right to a fair trial may end up being sacrificed when a trial faces a real but 
not significant risk. As it is often difficult to determine ahead of time what issues the 
case will turn on it may also be difficult to determine what information poses a 
significant risk to the trial. 
164 
This approach therefore still gives a significant amount of leeway to freedom 
of expression, and still poses a possible limitation on the right to a fair trial. This has 
been identified in relation to the United Kingdom's Contempt of Court Act 1981 
which requires that a publication causes a "substantial risk" of prejudice to 
proceedings in order for liability for contempt to be found, 
165 with Lord Lloyd stating 
that this approach is "a permanent shift in the balance of public interest away from the 
protection of the administration of justice and in favour of freedom of speech". 
166 
4 Protecting the right to a fair trial when there is a reasonable risk 
162 R v Burns (Travis) [2002] 1 NZLR 387, 404-405 (CA) Thomas J for the Court. 
163 Don Mathias, above n 148, 224-225 . 
164 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer, above n 2, 401-402. 
165 Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), s 2(2). 
166 Attorney General v Newspaper Publishing Ltd [1987] 3 All ER 276, 310 (EWCA) Lloyd LJ. 
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The final possible approach is one which does not allow the right to a fair trial 
to be balanced against if there is a reasonable risk that prejudice will be caused. This 
is very similar to the approach taken in R v Bums (Travis) but sets a lower threshold 
at which the right to a fair trial must be protected. Support for this approach can be 
found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act affirms New Zealand's commitment to 
the ICCPR. 167 The provisions in the ICCPR therefore form part of the relevant 
context in interpreting the rights contained in the Bill of Rights Act. 168 There is 
express recognition in the ICCPR that freedom of expression may be subject to 
restrictions that are provided by law and necessary for the respect of the rights of 
others or the protection of public order. 169 There is no such recognition of allowable 
restrictions on the right to a fair trial. 170 This means that under the ICCPR the right to 
a fair trial may only be derogated from when there is a public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation.171 While the Bill of Rights Act states that all of the 
rights it contains may be subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society", 172 the ICCPR suggests 
that limits to the right to a fair trial will only be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society if there is a public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation. 
If this argument is accepted then more care should be taken to protect the right 
to a fair trial than that taken under the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in R v 
Burns (Travis) and the United Kingdom Contempt of Court Act 1981. This may be 
achieved by setting a lower threshold at which the right will cease to be balanced 
against. A suggested approach is to set the threshold at the point where there is a 
reasonable risk to a fair trial. 173 This approach introduces an objective standard to 
determine whether a fair trial is at risk and in doing so may engage the right to a fair 
trial in more situations than if a significant risk were required. 
167 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Jong title (b). 
168 Hansen v R [2007] 3 NZLR 1, para 7 (NZSC) Elias CJ. 
169 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (19 December 1966) 999 UNTS 171, art 19(3). 
170 Ibid, art 14. 
17 1 Ibid, art 4(1). 
172 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
173 Don Mathias, above n 148, 225 . 
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Adopting this approach in New Zealand would give recognition to New 
Zealand's international obligations under the ICCPR. It would however mean that 
public interest and freedom of expression considerations would not be able to be 
taken into account whenever there is a reasonable risk to the right to a fair trial. 
While these interests would only be temporarily restricted there is one notable 
situation where this would certainly not be desirable - when a potentially dangerous 
person who has been accused of a crime has not been apprehended or has escaped 
from custody. In this situation taking the approach of not allowing the right to a fair 
trial to be risked may mean that the public is placed in danger. 
C The Best Approach 
In light of the above considerations the best approach to take to balancing the 
various interests in the context of sub judice contempt in New Zealand is the final 
approach explored above, with one slight variation. The variation would be to allow 
derogation from the principle of protecting the right to a fair trial in emergency 
situations. This would go further than the exception provided in the ICCPR for public 
emergencies which threaten the life of a nation and would instead be available when 
there is a risk to public safety. 
This approach would allow publication of details that may protect the public 
from harm, for instance the information that a potentially dangerous person is at large 
in the community, even if the publication of the details would cause prejudice to the 
right of the accused to a fair trial. This does not mean however that the accused 
person in this situation should be left to face an unfair trial, rather in this situation the 
court will need to put in place such measures as may counteract any prejudicial effects 
of publicity. Relegating the reliance on measures to counteract publicity to situations 
such as this allows the courts to use potentially useful measures when absolutely 
necessary but recognises that current research does not prove that these are reliable. 
In situations where the prejudicial effects of publicity cannot be remedied the 
appropriate action would be for the court to order a stay of proceedings. As this 
would only occur in a very limited set of circumstances (as publication of prejudicial 
details would only be allowed in a limited set of circumstances) this would recognise 
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the right of the Crown to bring offenders to justice while also aligning with the 
approach taken in the ICCPR that the right to a fair trial is not able to be limited 
except in extreme circumstances. 
While this approach would restrict freedom of expression more than the first 
three approaches examined, it must be remembered that this restriction would only be 
temporary. This is surely preferable to the permanent harm that may be caused by 
limiting the right to a fair trial. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Media coverage of criminal trials poses a risk to the right to a fair trial. To 
address this problem sub judice contempt restricts publications that are likely to 
endanger a fair trial, but in doing so restricts another fundamental right - freedom of 
expression. 
Freedom of expression is particularly significant in the context of media 
coverage of trials as it is important that the public are able to obtain information about 
how justice is administered in the courts. Public interest considerations are also 
relevant in this context, with the maintenance of public confidence in the 
administration of justice and public safety being particularly noteworthy. 
A vast body of research has not been able to conclusively prove that publicity 
surrounding trials does not influence jurors. There are no satisfactory alternatives that 
would protect the right to a fair trial without restricting freedom of expression. The 
restriction on freedom of expression imposed by sub judice contempt is therefore 
justified. 
While different approaches have been adopted in different jurisdictions to 
determine the appropriate balance between the competing interests involved in sub 
judice contempt the appropriate approach in New Zealand .. in light of our 
international obligations under the ICCPR - is to restrict freedom of expression 
whenever there is a reasonable risk to the right to a fair trial unless publication of 
potentially prejudicial matters is required to ensure public safety. 
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One need only open a newspaper or turn on the news to see that this is not 
currently the approach adopted by the media. It has been seen that this is also not the 
approach taken by the New Zealand courts. It is for the courts, not the media, to 
protect the right to a fair trial, so it is for the courts to decide if this situation will be 
rectified. 
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